Abstract. Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption can protect privacy of the receiver. However, there are some situations that we need to recover the identity of the receiver, for example a dispute occurs or the privacy mechanism is abused. In this paper, we propose a new concept, referred to as Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption with Identity Recovery(AIBEIR), which is an anonymous IBE with identity recovery property. There is a party called the Identity Recovery Manager(IRM) who has a secret key to recover the identity from the ciphertext in our scheme. We construct it with an anonymous IBE and a special IBE which we call it testable IBE. In order to ensure the semantic security in the case where the identity recovery manager is an adversary, we define a stronger semantic security model in which the adversary is given the secret key of the identity recovery manager. To our knowledge, we propose the first AIBEIR scheme and prove the security in our defined model.
Introduction
Public key encryption is one of the most important primitives in cryptography, which was presented in the great paper titled "New Directions in Cryptograph" in 1976 [DH76] . Public key encryption solves the problem that the sender and the receiver should share a common secret key which is not known to the adversary before communicating. One of the disadvantages in public key encryption is using certificate to bind the public key to the identity of its owner. The issue of management of certificates is complex and cumbersome.
In 1984, Shamir [Sha84] introduced the concept of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) which solved the problem. IBE is a generalization of public key encryption where the public key of a user can be arbitrary string such as an e-mail address. The first realizations of IBE are given by [SOK00,BF01] using groups equipped with bilinear maps. Since then, realizations from bilinear maps [BB04a, BB04b, Wat05, Gen06, Wat09] , from quadratic residues modulo composite [Coc01, BGH07] , from lattices [GPV08,CHKP10,ABB10,Boy10] and from the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [DG17] have been proposed.
In order to protect the privacy of the receiver, Boyen [Boy03] first explicitly stated the concept of anonymous IBE 3 , where the ciphertext does not leak the identity of the recipient. In fact, [BF01] is the first anonymous IBE scheme although they did not state it explicitly. Since then, there are some follow-up works realized from bilinear maps [BW06] , from quadratic residues modulo composite [AG09] , from lattices [GPV08, ABB10] and from the computational DiffieHellman assumption [BLSV17] .
Anonymous IBE protects the privacy of the message and the receiver's identity in the meantime, but we can only recover the message. However, there are some situations where we need to recover the identity of the receiver, for example a dispute occurs or the privacy mechanism is abused. In a mail system, there is a need to keep the receiver anonymous for everyone except the mail sever who will forward the mail to the receiver. So can we extract the identity from an anonymous IBE ciphertext with some secret information? In this paper, we present a new primitive called anonymous identity-based encryption with identity recovery(AIBEIR) which can solve this problem. AIBEIR is a special anonymous IBE which has an additional property that the identity recovery manager can recover the identity with a secret key. But the identity recovery manager can not get any information of the message from the ciphertext. Formally, AIBEIR is semantic secure even when the identity recovery manager is the adversary.
Motivations
On the one hand, anonymity protects user's privacy. On the other hand, unconditional privacy may lose supervision and cause illegal behavior. To balance the anonymity and accountability in anonymous IBE schemes, PKG can send the recovery key to a manager who takes charge of recovering identities of suspected ciphertexts. A similar notion was presented in group signature where a group manager can reveal the member identity registered to is group. But there is a subtlety that signature can be verified while general encryption does not have verifiable property. If a mole want to communicate with his partners, he will choose other secure encryption schemes other than encryption schemes with recovery property. In fact, it is inefficient if every ciphertext should be verified before delivering. So we can just restrict that the anonymous IBE with recovery is the only choice. For example, in the army, the internal communication tool is deployed with anonymous IBE with recovery. If some ciphertext is suspected to contain sensible data which is not allowed to send to the recipient.
In fact, anonymous IBE with recovery identity subdivides the privacy which makes the ciphertext anonymous for all users except some privileged supervisors. Imagine that how can an anonymous IBE encryption under the destination IP address be transferred. Routers with recovery key can recover the corresponding identities of the ciphertext which makes it viable. Similarly, in a mail system deployed with anonymous IBE, the server does not know which one is the recipient.
Our Contributions
We propose a new cryptographic primitive called anonymous IBE with identity recovery. We first define the model and security notions of AIBEIR. We then present a method to convert an anonymous IBE into AIBEIR with the help of testable IBE and prove that the new scheme satisfies the security we defined. A testable IBE is an IBE which can test whether ciphertext c is a ciphertext under identity id given c and id. It is obvious that a testable IBE is not anonymous. We will show that [BB04a, Wat05] and their variations are testable IBEs. AIBEIR consists of four parties, a Private Key Generator(PKG), an Identity Recovery Manager(IRM), a sender, and a receiver. There are five procedures in an AIBEIR scheme. They are setup procedure, extract procedure, encrypt procedure, decrypt procedure and recover procedure.
Besides correctness and anonymity, we introduce two new security notions in AIBEIR. The first is a stronger semantic security, where the identity recovery manager is the adversary. The second is recovery, which ensures that the recovery is reliable and no adversary can fool the identity recovery manager. Finally, We prove the security of our AIBEIR scheme according to our security notions. To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first anonymous IBE scheme with the identity recovery property.
To construct an AIBEIR scheme, we first encrypt the plaintext by a testable IBE and encrypt the testable IBE ciphertext using an anonymous IBE. Moreover, we encrypt the receiver's identity under the recovery manager's identity. The anonymity is guaranteed by the anonymous IBE and the stronger CPA security is guaranteed by the security of the testable IBE. Given the master secret key of the anonymous IBE, identity recovery manager obtains the identity and the testable IBE ciphertext by decrypting corresponding ciphertext, respectively. Then, check whether the testable IBE ciphertext is under the identity and output the identity if the test algorithm outputs 1.
Related Work
Identity-based cryptosystems were introduced by Shamir [Sha84] . The first realizations of IBE were given by Boneh, Franklin [BF01] and Sakai et al [SOK00] . Boneh and Franklin gave the security model and their proposal is the first anonymous IBE. The anonymity was first noticed by Boyen [Boy03] . Another view of Anonymous IBE is as a combination of identity-based encryption with the property of key privacy, which was introduced by Bellare et al [BBDP01] . A similar concept called Identity-Based Group Encryption(IBGE) was presented by Xiling et al [LRL + 16] . Traceability in their scheme is similar to recovery in ours. But there are some differences between IBGE and AIBEIR. On the one hand, we do not have Verify algorithm which is used to verify whether the ciphertext belongs to the group. On the other hand, our construction is implemented by IBEs while they utilized PKE, IBE and ZKP(Zero-Knowledge Proofs) to construct their scheme. We do not think their scheme is a "pure" IBE because of the use of PKE. Recently, [GSRD17] pointed that the zero-knowledge proof used in [LRL + 16] leaks much more information, due to which the verifier who is honest but curious will be able to identify the designated recipient. They proposed a construction with six random oracles.
Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce definitions that we use throughout the paper including a definition of anonymous identity-based encryption and testable identity-based encryption. In Sect. 3, we show the syntax and security of the new primitive anonymous identity-based encryption with identity recovery. In Sect. 4, we present the construction of AIBEIR and prove its security. We conclude the paper in Sect. 5.
Preliminaries and Definitions
We denote s $ ← − S as the operation of assigning to s an element selected uniformly at random from set S. The notation x ← A(·) denotes the operation of running an algorithm A with some given input and assigning the output to x. A function negl: N → R is negligible if for every positive polynomial poly and sufficiently large λ, it holds that negl(λ)<1/poly(λ). We use 0 ℓ to denote the zero vector whose length is ℓ. If a is a vector, |a| denotes its length.
Bilinear Groups
Let G 1 ,G 2 and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g 1 ,g 2 be generators of groups G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a bilinear map that holds the following features:
there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any input pair
We assume a symmetric bilinear map such that G 1 = G 2 = G and g 1 = g 2 = g.
Identity-Based Encryption
Let λ be a security parameter. An identity-based encryption is a tuple of algorithms Π IBE = (IBE.Setup,IBE.Extract,IBE.Encrypt,IBE.Decrypt) with the following properties:
• Setup(1 λ ): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input 1 λ and outputs the system parameter mpk and a master secret key msk.
• Extract(id, msk): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input user's identity id and master secret key msk, and outputs the user's corresponding private key sk id .
• Encrypt(m, id, mpk): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a message m in the message space, system parameter mpk, the receiver's identity id and outputs a ciphertext c in the ciphertext space.
• Decrypt(mpk, c, sk id ): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input system parameter mpk, ciphertext c, user's private key sk id , outputs the message m in the message space.
Correctness. We require correctness of decryption: that is, for all λ, all identity id in the identity space, all m in the specified message space, P r[Decrypt(mpk,sk id , Encrypt(m, id, mpk)) = m] = 1 − negl(λ) holds, where the probability is taken over the randomness of the algorithms. Anonymity and Semantic security. When the ciphertext can not reveal information of the message, we say that the cryptosystem is chosen-plaintext secure. We say that the cryptosystem is anonymous if the ciphertext can not reveal information of the identity of the receiver. We combine these two notions.
Definition 1 An IBE scheme is anonymous against chosen-identity and chosenplaintext attacks if there does not exist any polynomial adversary A who has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of the IBE. It provides A with the system parameters mpk while keeping the master secret key msk to itself.
Phase 1:
The adversary A can make any polynomial key-extraction queries defined as follows: key-extraction query (id): The adversary A can choose an identity id and sends it to the challenger. The challenger generates a secret key sk id of id and returns it to A.
Challenge: When A decides that Phase 1 is complete, it chooses two equallength plaintexts m 0 , m 1 and two identities id 0 , id 1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys. The challenger chooses uniformly at random two bits b ∈ {0, 1}, γ ∈ {0, 1} and sends a ciphertext c * of m b as the challenge ciphertext under id γ to A.
Phase 2:
The adversary A can also make queries just like Phase 1 except that it cannot make a key-extraction query of either id 0 or id 1 .
We define the advantage of the adversary A as
Testable Identity-Based Encryption
Definition 2 An Identity-Based Encryption is testable if there exists an algorithm Test(·, ·) which takes as input c and an identity id and returns 1 if c is a part of a valid cipertext under id and 0 otherwise.
Remark 1 In our construction, we need the testable IBE to satisfy an additional property that the ciphertext c can be partitioned into two parts c 0 and c 1 where c 0 contains information of the identity but no information of the message while c 1 contains information of the message but no information of the identity. And the test algorithm takes c 0 other than c as input. Our construction works if the testable IBE without this property. But if it is satisfied, our construction is more efficient because encrypting the part containing information of plaintext is sufficient. Moreover, to our knowledge, all of the existing testable IBEs satisfy it. Let G be a group of prime order, p, for which there exists an efficiently computable bilinear map into G 1 . Additionally, let e : G × G → G 1 denote the bilinear map and g be the corresponding generator. The size of the group is determined by the security parameter. Identities will be represented as bit strings of length n, a separate parameter unrelated to p. The construction follows.
Setup.The system parameters are generated as follows. We choose a random generator, g ∈ G and g 2 randomly in G. We choose a secret α ∈ Z p and set g 1 = g α . Further, choose a random value u ′ ∈ G and a random n−length vector U = (u i ), whose elements are chosen at random from G. The published public parameters are g, g 1 , g 2 , u ′ , and U . The master secret key is g α 2 .
Key Generation. Let v be a n-bit string representing an identity, v i denote the ith bit of v, and V ⊆ {1, ..., n} be the set of all i for which v i = 1. (That is V is the set of indices for which the bit string v is set to 1.) A private key for identity v is generated as follows. First, a random r ∈ Z p is chosen. Then the private key is constructed as:
Encryption. A message M ∈ G 1 is encrypted for an identity v as follows. A value t ∈ Z p is chosen at random. The ciphertext is then constructed as:
We can also define a Test algorithm as follows:
Test.Let C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) be a valid encryption under the identity v. Let v ′ be a n bit string representing an identity, v ′ i denote the ith bit of v ′ , and V ′ ⊆ {1, ..., n} be the set of all i for which v
) and ⊥ otherwise. In fact, (C 1 ,C 2 ) contain the information of the message and no information of the identity. C 3 contains information of the identity but no information of the message. So it is a testable IBE.
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption with Identity Recovery
Compared to identity based encryption, there is an additional algorithm Recover that takes recovery secret key and a ciphertext as inputs and output the corresponding identity or ⊥ if the ciphertext is not valid. Let λ be a security parameter. An anonymous identity-based encryption with recovery is a tuple of algorithms Π AIBEIR = (AIBEIR.Setup,AIBEIR.Extract,AIBEIR.Encrypt,AIBEIR.Decrypt, AIBEIR.Recover) with the following properties:
• Setup(1 λ :) This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input 1 λ and outputs the system parameter mpk, a master secret key msk and secret key of the identity recovery manager sk IRM . Then PKG sends sk IRM to the identity recovery manager in a secret channel. It is operated by PKG.
• Extract(id, msk): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a user' identity id and msk, outputs the user' corresponding private key sk id .
• Encrypt(m, mpk, id): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input a message m in a specified message space, system parameter mpk, the receiver' identity id and outputs a ciphertext c in the ciphertext space. It is operated by the sender.
• Decrypt(mpk, c, sk id ): This is a polynomial time algorithm which takes as input system parameter mpk, ciphertext c, user' private key sk id , outputs the message m in the message space. It is operated by the receiver.
• Recover(c, sk IRM ): The identity recovery manager outputs an identity id if c is a valid cipertext under id and ⊥ otherwise. It is operated by the identity recovery manager.
Correctness. We say that Π AIBEIR is correct if it satisfies the following two properties:
• Decryption correctness: For any id in identity space and m in a specified message space, P r[AIBEIR.Decrypt(sk id ,AIBEIR.Encrypt(m,id,mpk)) = m] = 1 − negl(λ)
Anonymity. The anonymity of AIBEIR is the same as that of anonymous IBE. Note that the recovery manager can not be the adversary. Stronger semantic security. In the semantic security model of IBE, adversary has no information about the master secret key msk. But in the definition of our AIBEIR scheme, the identity recovery manager holds sk IRM which makes it more powerful. So if the identity recovery manager is the adversary, the semantic security model of IBE is not feasible. We define a stronger semantic security as follows:
Definition 3 An AIBEIR scheme is strongly semantic secure against chosenidentity and chosen-plaintext attacks if there does not exist any polynomial adversary A who have non-negligible advantage in the game below:
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of the AIBEIR. It provides A with the system public parameters mpk and identity recovery secret key sk IRM while keeping the master secret key msk to itself.
Phase 1:
The adversary A can make any polynomial key-extraction queries defined as follows: key-extraction query (id): A can choose an identity id and send it to the challenger. The challenger generates secret key sk id and returns it to A.
Challenge: When A decides that Phase 1 is complete, it chooses two equallength plaintexts m 0 , m 1 and an identity id * under the constraint that it has not asked for the private key and sends them to the challenger. The challenger chooses uniformly at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sends a ciphertext c * = Encrypt(m b , id * , mpk) as the challenge ciphertext to A.
Phase 2: A can also make queries just like Phase 1 except that it cannot make a key-extraction query of id * .
Guess: A outputs a guess b ′ of b.
We define the advantage of adversary A as
Recovery. An AIBEIR scheme is recoverable if Recover algorithm can always extract the right identity from a valid ciphertext and output ⊥ when the input is an invalid ciphertext.
Definition 4 An AIBEIR scheme is recoverable if there does not exist any PPT adversary A who wins the following game with non-negligible probability.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of the AIBEIR. It provides A with the system parameters mpk while keeping the master secret key msk and sk IRM to itself.
Monitor Phase: The adversary A can query recover oracle and key-extraction oracle.
Challenge: When A decides that Monitor Phase is complete, the adversary sends c * to the challenger. The challenger sends the output of Recover algorithm to A.
Output: A wins the game if the output of Recover(c * , sk IRM ) is ⊥ or id while c * is a valid ciphertext under id ′ where id = id ′ or the output of Recover(c * , sk IRM ) is id while c * is not a valid ciphertext. Here we require id has not been asked as a key-extraction query for the need to prove the security.
A Construction from Anonymous IBE and Testable IBE
In this section, we present our construction of AIBEIR from anonymous IBE and testable IBE. Let Π 1 = (A-IBE.Setup,A-IBE.Enc,A-IBE.Dec,A-IBE.Extract) be an anonymous IBE scheme, Π 2 = (T-IBE.Setup,T-IBE.Enc,T-IBE.Dec,T-IBE.Extract, T-IBE.Test) be a testable IBE scheme. Let id ǫ denote the identity of the identity recovery manager in scheme Π 2 . Then, we can construct an AIBEIR scheme Π as follows:
The Construction
We describe our AIBEIR scheme (AIBEIR.Setup, AIBEIR.Extract, AIBEIR.Encrypt, AIBEIR.Decrypt,AIBEIR.Recover) as follows:
• Setup(1 λ ): Run the Setup algorithms of A-IBE and T-IBE and obtain Remark 2 Here the message space of Π 1 includes the ciphertext space of Π 2 . We set the intersection of identity space of Π 1 and Π 2 as the identity space of Π.
Correctness
Theorem 1 If Π 1 is a correct anonymous IBE scheme and Π 2 is a correct testable IBE scheme then Π is a correct AIBEIR scheme.
• Decryption correctness: The decryption correctness is guaranteed by the decryption correctness of Π 1 and Π 2 .
• Recovery correctness: The recovery correctness is guaranteed by the decryption correctness of Π 1 , Π 2 and test correctness of Π 2 .
Anonymity
Theorem 2 If Π 1 is an IBE scheme which is anonymous against adaptively chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks and Π 2 is a testable IBE scheme which is fully secure against chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks, then Π is an AIBEIR scheme which is anonymous against adaptively chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks. Proof. We prove the above theorem by hybrid arguments.
This hybrid is the real experiment in the Definition 1. The logic of the challenger is shown as follows: initialization: 
send c = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) to A H 1 : In this hybrid, it is identical to H 0 except that we just change how the challenge ciphertext is generated. We replace the lines marked (1) in H 0 as follows:
H 2 : Compared to H 1 , we replace the lines marked (2) in H 0 as follows:
H 3 : Same as H 2 , except we replace the lines marked (2) in H 0 as follows:
We just randomly choose id from identity space except id 0 and id 1 . We then set c 2 = A-IBE.Enc(0 |c0| , id, M P K A ).
Identical to H 3 , except we replace the lines marked (3) in H 0 as follows:
We just set c 3 as T-IBE.
It is easy to know that the challenge ciphertext in H 4 contains no information about b and γ (except their length). So the advantage of A in H 4 is 0. We prove the above theorem by showing that H 0 ≈ H 1 ≈ H 2 ≈ H 3 ≈ H 4 through the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Any P P T adversary cannot distinguish H 0 and H 1 , if scheme Π 2 is fully secure against adaptively chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. We can construct a simulator B to break the full security against chosenidentity and chosen-plaintext attacks of scheme Π 2 , if there is an adversary A who can distinguish H 0 and H 1 . Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of Π 2 . It provides B with the system parameters M P K T while keeping the master secret key M SK T to itself. B computes (M P K A , M SK A ) ← A-IBE.Setup(1 λ ), and sends
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends an identity id to B, B just forwards it as the key-extraction query to the challenger. The challenger sends SK T,id to B. B computes SK A,id = A-IBE.Extract(id, M SK A ) and sends sk id = (SK A,id , SK T,id ) to A.
Challenge: A chooses id 0 and id 1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys and two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 and sends them to B. B just chooses randomly two bits b and γ and sends (m b , 0, id γ ) to the challenger. The challenger chooses uniformly at random a bit b ′ and sends c 0 ,
Phase 2: A makes key-extraction queries except id 0 , id 1 . B answers queries just like Phase 1.
Guess A sends a bitb as a guess of Hb to B. B just forwards it to the challenger.
The view of A is identical to H 0 if b ′ = 0 and to H 1 if b ′ = 1. Thus, by the semantic security of scheme Π 2 , we can conclude that H 0 ≈ H 1 .
Lemma 2 Any P P T adversary cannot distinguish H 1 and H 2 , if scheme Π 1 is anonymous against adaptive-identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. Given a PPT adversary A who can distinguish H 1 and H 2 , we can construct a simulator B attacking the anonymous security of Π 1 against adaptiveidentity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Setup:
The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of Π 1 . It provides B with the system parameters M P K A while keeping the master secret key M SK A to itself. B computes
Phase 1: When A makes key-extraction query and sends an identity id to B, B just forwards id as the key-extraction query to the challenger. The challenger sends SK A,id to B. B runs SK T,id = T-IBE.Extract(id, M SK T ) and sends sk id = (SK A,id , SK T,id ) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 and two identities id 0 , id 1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys and sends them to B. B chooses uniformly at random a bit γ ′ ∈ {0, 1} and computes c 0 , Phase 2: B answers queries just like Phase 1, but id 0 and id 1 cannot be queried.
Guess: A sends a bitb as a guess of Hb +1 to B. B randomly choose a bit γ and sendsb and γ to the challenger.
If b = 0, the view of A is identical to H 1 . If b = 1, the view of A is identical to H 2 . We can see that H 1 ≈ H 2 by the anonymity of Π 1 .
Lemma 3 Any P P T adversary cannot distinguish H 2 and H 3 , if scheme Π 1 is anonymous secure against adaptively chosen-identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. Given a PPT adversary A who can distinguish H 2 and H 3 , we can construct a simulator B attacking the anonymous security of Π 1 against adaptively chosen-identity, chosen-plaintext attacks.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of Π 1 . It provides B with the system parameters M P K A while keeping the master secret key M SK A to itself. B computes (M P K T , M SK T ) ←T-IBE.Setup(1 λ ), and sends mpk = (M P K A , M P K T ) to A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends an identity id to B, B just forwards id as the key-extraction query to the challenger. The challenger sends SK A,id to B. B obtains SK T,id = T-IBE.Extract(id,M SK T ) and sends sk id = (SK A,id , SK T,id ) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 and two identities id 0 , id 1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys and sends them to B. B chooses uniformly at random a bit γ ′ ∈ {0, 1} and computes c 0 ,
randomly chooses an identity id from identity space except id 0 , id 1 and sends (0, 0,id γ ′ , id )to the challenger. The challenger chooses uniformly at random a bit γ and a bit b.If γ =0 ,the challenger sends c 2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, id γ ′ , M P K A ) to B. If γ =1 ,the challenger sends c 2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, id, M P K A ) to B. B sends (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) to A.
Phase 2: B answers queries just like Phase 1, but id 0 and id 1 cannot be asked.
Guess: A sends a bitγ as a guess of Hγ +2 to B. B randomly choose a bitb and sendsγ andb to the challenger.
If γ = 0, the view of A is identical in H 2 . If γ = 1, the view of A is identical in H 3 .The probability that A can distinguish H 2 and H 3 equals |P r[γ
because of the anonymity of Π 1 . So the conclusion is that H 2 ≈ H 3 .
Lemma 4 Any P P T adversary cannot distinguish H 3 and H 4 , if scheme Π 2 is secure against chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Proof. Given a P P T adversary A which can distinguish H 3 and H 4 , we can construct a simulator B attacking the semantic security of Π 2 against chosenidentity and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of Π 2 and obtains (M P K T , M SK T ). It sends M P K T to B and keeps M SK T to itself. B computes (M P K A , M SK A ) ← A-IBE.Setup(1 λ ) and sends mpk = (M P K A , M P K T ) to A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes key-extraction query and sends an identity id to B, B just forwards it as the key-extraction query to the challenger. The challenger sends M SK T,id to B. B computes SK A,id = A-IBE.Extract(id, M SK A ) and sends sk id = (SK A,id , SK T,id ) to A.
Challenge: A chooses two equal-length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 and two identities id 0 , id 1 under the constraint that they have not been asked for the private keys and sends them to B. B chooses uniformly at random a bit γ ∈ {0, 1} and computes c 0 , c 1 = T-IBE.Enc(0, id γ , M P K T ). B randomly chooses an identity id from the identity space except id 0 , id 1 and computes c 2 = A-IBE.Enc(0, id, M P K A ). B sends (id γ , 0, id ǫ )to the challenger.The challenger chooses uniformly at random a bit b and sends c 3 to B.
The view of A is identical to H 3 if b = 0, and H 4 otherwise. The probability that the adversary can distinguish H 3 and H 4 equals the advantage of B breaking the semantic security of Π 2 . So we can draw the conclusion that H 3 ≈ H 4 .
Having proved the above lemmas, we have completed the proof of Theorem 2.
Stronger Semantic Security
Theorem 3 The AIBEIR scheme Π is strongly semantic secure if Π 2 is semantic secure against chosen-identity and chosen-plaintext attack.
Proof. We can construct a simulator B breaking semantic security of Π 2 if there exists an adversary A breaking the stronger semantic security of Π. Phase 2: A makes key-extraction queries except id * . B answers queries just like Phase 1.
Guess: B just forwards the output of A to the challenger.
If A wins, we can see A as a distinguish oracle. When B obtains the challenge ciphertext from challenger, B just encrypts it by the Encrypt algorithm of A-IBE and sends it to A. We can see that the probability that A breaks the stronger semantic security equals the probability that B breaks the semantic security of Π 2 .
Recovery
Theorem 4 If the testable IBE scheme Π 2 is secure against adaptive-identity and chosen ciphertext attack, then the AIBEIR scheme Π satisfies recovery.
Proof. If the adversary wins in the recovery experiment, there are two cases: (1) the adversary outputs a valid AIBEIR ciphertext but the challenger output ⊥ or a wrong identity. This will not happen, which is guaranteed by the correctness of Recover algorithm. (2) the adversary outputs an invalid AIBEIR ciphertext but the challenger does not output ⊥. We just consider the case where (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) is a valid ciphertxt 5 . In fact, if (c 1 , c 2 ) is not a valid ciphertext, the receiver cannot decrypt correctly using its secret key. And if c 3 is not a valid T-IBE ciphertext under id ǫ , challenger will output ⊥.
If (c 1 , c 2 ) is a valid ciphertext under id and c 3 is a testable IBE ciphertext of a different identity id under id ǫ , we can show that the identity recovery manager will return ⊥ with overwhelming probability. In fact, if there exists a PPT adversary A who can fool the identity recovery manager in the recovery game, we can construct a simulator S attacking Π 2 in adaptive-identity, chosen-plaintext attack.
Setup: The challenger takes as input a security parameter λ (in unary) and runs the Setup algorithm of Π 2 . It provides B with the system parameters M P K T while keeping the master secret key M SK T to itself. B computes (M P K A , M SK A ) ← A-IBE.Setup(1 λ ) and sends mpk = (M P K A , M P K T ) to A.
Phase 1: When the adversary A makes the key-extraction queries, B just forwards the identity queried by A to the challenger and obtains SK T,id from the challenger. B obtains SK A,id = A-IBE.Extract(id, M SK A ) and sends sk id = (SK A,id , SK T,id ) to A. When A makes recover query, B gets SK T,idǫ by making secret key query of id ǫ to the challenger and obtains id by decrypting c 3 using SK T,idǫ . B computes SK A,id = A-IBE.Extract(id, M SK A ) and then obtains c 0 by running Dec algorithm of A-IBE. B computes h = T-IBE.Test(c 0 , id), and sends id to A if h = 1, and ⊥ otherwise. We say A wins if it outputs a valid "doubleencrypt" IBE ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 ) under id 1 and a valid testable IBE ciphertext c 3 of id 2 which pass the recover algorithm 6 (A can output the randomness used in the encrypt algorithm to show it ). Here we constrain that id 1 has not been queried the private key before. B obtains SK T,id2 by making the secret key query of id 2 .
Challenge: B randomly chooses two equal-length message m 0 , m 1 and sends m 0 , m 1 and id 1 to challenger. Challenger randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and obtains (c 0 , c 1 ) = T-IBE.Enc(m b , id 1 , M P K T ).
Phase 2: B makes some queries to key-extraction oracle. In fact, B does not need to query now. 
Conclusion
We define a new primitive called AIBEIR and construct it using double encryption with an anonymous IBE and a testable IBE. AIBEIR is anonymous for all users except the identity recovery manager who can recover the identity from the ciphertext. But the identity recovery manager can not obtain information about plaintext from ciphertext even holding an identity recover secret key. To our knowledge, [BB04a,Wat05] and their variations satisfy our testable IBE definition. We leave as an open problem the question of constructing testable IBE from other standard assumptions, such as lattice. Another interesting area of research is to construct more practical AIBEIR schemes.
